An extensive-form game is a specification of a game in game theory, allowing (as the name suggests) explicit representation of a number of important aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when he makes a decision, and his payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games also allow representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events encoded as "moves by nature".
Other articles related to "game":
... The tree on the left represents such a game, either with infinite action spaces (any real number between 0 and 5000) or with very large action spaces (perhaps any integer between 0 and 5000) ... subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game can be found by taking the first partial derivative (reference?) of each payoff function with respect to the follower's (firm 2 ...
Famous quotes containing the word game:
“The notion that the public accepts or rejects anything in modern art ... is merely romantic fiction.... The game is completed and the trophies distributed long before the public knows what has happened.”
—Tom Wolfe (b. 1931)