Development
The first study to define ASDS was performed in 1983. Competitive conceptual designs were developed in the late 1980s, the Request for Proposal was issued in 1993, and the first contract for design and construction of the ASDS was awarded in 1994.
The Navy has stated a requirement for six units, but that was established before it decided to convert four Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines to guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) with the additional mission of support of special operations forces. Each of the SSGNs will be capable of carrying two ASDS vehicles.
The first ASDS became operational (completed testing and evaluation) from its base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 2003 and completed its first deployment on board an attack submarine, the USS Greeneville, to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as a unit of Expeditionary Strike Group One. The first ASDS has yet to be joined by other units, as the program has been slowed by escalating costs and technical problems. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study issued in 2003 cited two major technical problems: noisy propellers and silver-zinc batteries that depleted more quickly than planned. A new propeller made of composite material has been developed to rectify the noise problem. Development is under way on lithium-ion batteries to replace the silver-zinc batteries and enable the electrical system to meet the Navy's requirements. Yardney Technical Products of Pawcatuck, Conn., has been awarded a $44 million contract modification to provide four lithium-ion batteries for the ASDS program by May 2009.
In the end, however, technical, reliability, and cost issues have proven nearly insurmountable. Indeed, the ASDS has been cancelled for all intents and purposes; all that's left is an ASDS-1 improvement program to boost the performance of the existing sub and complete its operational testing. The Richmond Times-Dispatch notes that the ASDS mini-subs were originally supposed to cost $80 million each, but numerous problems with the first boat have ballooned its cost to $446 million so far (vendor and government facility costs inclusive). Instead of completing integration and entering service in 2000, testing continued and the first boat was officially delivered in July 2003. GlobalSecurity adds that the program was initially projected to cost $527 million (including delivery of all six boats), but it is now predicted to rise to more than $2 billion – significantly more than the $1.4 billion SSGN Tactical Trident conversion program to which it is related.
Funding was provided via Congressional line item to the Special Operations Command. The Navy Deep Submergence Office was selected as the technical design agent and program office. Technical assistance was provided by the Navy Experimental Dive Unit, Panama City; the Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado;SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2, Norfolk; and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Special Operations and Acquisition Logistics (SOAL), Tampa.
Detailed design of the first ASDS was started in 1994, and hull construction undertaken in 1996, at a government estimated cost of US$160 million, to a low bid for the delivery of $69 million for the first ASDS (to include non-recurring design costs, fabrication, and testing), and subsequent copies for $25 million each. It was delivered for testing and evaluation in 2000 and cost US$300 million (vendor and program office costs inclusive) to develop. Subsequent submarines were estimated to cost $125 million (based on a 2001 estimate) a copy. Five more were planned, but production of the second system was placed on indefinite hold in December 2005 pending a production and cost review, and the resolution of many reliability problems (primarily wiring grounds).
Read more about this topic: Advanced SEAL Delivery System
Famous quotes containing the word development:
“The man, or the boy, in his development is psychologically deterred from incorporating serving characteristics by an easily observable fact: there are already people around who are clearly meant to serve and they are girls and women. To perform the activities these people are doing is to risk being, and being thought of, and thinking of oneself, as a woman. This has been made a terrifying prospect and has been made to constitute a major threat to masculine identity.”
—Jean Baker Miller (20th century)
“The Cairo conference ... is about a complicated web of education and employment, consumption and poverty, development and health care. It is also about whether governments will follow where women have so clearly led them, toward safe, simple and reliable choices in family planning. While Cairo crackles with conflict, in the homes of the world the orthodoxies have been duly heard, and roundly ignored.”
—Anna Quindlen (b. 1952)
“Somehow we have been taught to believe that the experiences of girls and women are not important in the study and understanding of human behavior. If we know men, then we know all of humankind. These prevalent cultural attitudes totally deny the uniqueness of the female experience, limiting the development of girls and women and depriving a needy world of the gifts, talents, and resources our daughters have to offer.”
—Jeanne Elium (20th century)