CIA Transnational Activities in Counterproliferation - Nuclear/fissionable - 2002 Intelligence On Iraq

2002 Intelligence On Iraq

Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Muss Destruction, the Intelligence Community (IC) prepared several Community papers on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and, more specificalIy, Iraq's nuclear weapons program. In October 1998, the IC published a National Intelligence Council PIC) Memorandum, Current Iraqi WMD Capabilities. In December 2000, the IC published an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Cupabilities (ICA 2000-007HCX). The assessment was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery system programs in the absence of weapons inspectors, as well as a review of what remains of the WMD arsenal and outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of the United Nations Special Cornmission (UNSCOM).

On Iraq's nuclear program, the IC also produced a Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) report in October 1997, Reconstitution ofI raq's Nuclear Weapons Program: An Update (JAEIC 97-004) and a JAEIC report in June 1999, Reconstitution of Iraq s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox (JAEIC 99-003.)

All of the assessments in these Community papers on Iraq's nuclear program were consistent in assessing that: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM had destroyed portions of, and neutralized the remainder of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure but that Iraq retained the foundation for future nuclear reconstitution. Iraq continued low-level clandestine theoretical research and training of personnel, and was attempting to procure dual-use technologies and materials that could be used to reconstitute its nuclear program. If Iraq acquired a significant quantity of fissile material through foreign assistance, it could have a crude nuclear weapon within a year.