Outcome
On May 31, 1947, as Peng Dehuai learned the news of the defeat of the communist 2nd Column, he immediately changed his target of his next battle by telegraphing Mao Zedong on the same day with the local communist party boss Xi Zhongxun, claiming that:”The 82nd Division of the Ma clique in Qinghai was very tough and our force had concentrated in preparation for first annihilating the 81st Division of Ma clique in Ningxia, and then to strike the 82nd Division.” Half a month later, the communist scored a victory in Huan (环) county against the nationalist 81st Division of Ma clique in Ningxia, but it was not until the Xifu Campaign in 1948 did Peng Dehuai was able to fulfill his wish of engaging the nationalist 82nd Division of the Ma clique in Qinghai, but once again, the communist was defeated. Also on May 31, 1947, the political commissar of the communist 2nd Column, Wang Enmao (王恩茂) wrote in his diary admitting that the defeat with extreme heavy casualties, which caused the delay of the Eastern Gansu Campaign planned by the communists. On June 1, 1947, Wang Zhen telegraphed Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun to report that the campaign was lost and Wang Zhen himself was responsible, claiming that the forces of Ma clique in Qinghai was very capable, and they acted swiftly and bravely in battles, and this was not an exaggeration to make any excuses. The communist 359th Brigade along suffered over 800 fatalities and had exhausted most of the ammunition, and thus had to retreat to a different region for several days to regroup and re-supply.
On June 1, 1947, the political commissar of the communist 2nd Column, Wang Enmao (王恩茂) wrote in his diary that the 22nd Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Brigade of the nationalist Reorganized 82nd Division was ill equipped in comparison to other nationalist units and lacked heavy weaponry. However, these nationalist troops were extremely tough and very combat capable. Once their unit was defeated, they could still fight on individually and launch counterattacks, and refused to lay down their arms. Unlike other nationalist units which often ignored the plea of their comrades-in-arms for reinforcement, the forces of the Ma clique in Qinghai not only would reinforce their comrades-in-arms for sure, but they would reinforce their comrades-in-arms multiple times. The communists had gravely underestimated their nationalist opponents in this campaign. The political commissar in his diary concluded that under no circumstance should the enemy be underestimated. The second realization was that the main enemy’s position must be taken for the battle to conclude, otherwise, the defenders could launch counterattacks and driven the attackers from the city. The third point was there must be reserves. The fourth was the effectiveness of the artillery bombardment, but one could not solely depend on artillery bombardment, and the fifth point was the need to be always prepared for the enemy’s counterattacks. Peng Dehuai instructed the communist 2nd Column to rest of ten days and to use the time to find the mistakes that caused the defeat. Wang Zhen admitted that since he had joined the communist revolution, he fought several hundred battles and there were both victories and defeats, but none of them as bad as in this campaign. Peng Dehuai concluded in late October, 1947 on a conference included commanders of battalion level and above that the main reason of the communist defeat was underestimating the enemy, claiming that branching out in three fronts to attack Ma clique in both Qinghai and Ningxia was a blunder. In his work titled “Combat Evaluations in Shaanxi for the Past Nine Months”, Peng Dehuai further admitted that launching another new campaign just thirteen days after the end of Panlong Campaign was also a blunder in that the communists troops were exhausted and had not had the time needed to rest and regroup.
In contrast, the nationalists celebrated the victory in grand scale. After learning the news of the successful beating back the enemy’s attack, Ma Bufang ordered the Guo Xueli (郭学礼), the provincial interior minister to organize a large delegation that included the members of Qinghai provincial dance studio to visit the troops participated in the campaign. The delegation visited cities and towns included Western Peak (Xifeng, 西峰), Qingyang (庆阳), and Heshui (合水) to hold numerous celebrations, and the nationalist central government also issued medals and other rewards to the nationalist troops excelled in the campaign. Ma Jiyuan (马继援), the nationalist commander in this campaign also made special trips to Lanzhou and Xining to report on the campaign to Hu Zongnan and Ma Bufang, and the experience gained in this campaign would help the nationalists to defeat their communist enemy once again in Xifu Campaign in 1948.
Read more about this topic: Heshui Campaign
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